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SUBCONSTITUTIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUPPLEMENT, SHAM, OR SUBSTITUTE?
MARK TUSHNET*
Professor Coenen has given us an extraordinarily valuable
examination of subconstitutional doctrines that allow the Supreme
Court to influence legislative choice without dictating it.' Professor
Coenen presents subconstitutional doctrines as supplements to
the forms of judicial review that dominate theorizing about
constitutional law. Those dominating forms, which I call substantivejudicial review, involve the displacement of legislative and
executive choice by the courts' specification of constitutional norms.
In contrast, the subconstitutional doctrines Professor Coenen
describes and commends allow the political branches to pursue
their preferred policies, if only they do so in the proper way. But,
according to Professor Coenen, subconstitutional doctrines still
leave open the possibility of substantive judicial review.
In this brief Comment I make two points.2 First, the subconstitutional doctrines appear to have the advantage of allowing
elected lawmakers to pursue whatever course they wish, as long as
they satisfy the requirements of these subconstitutional doctrines.
In practice, however, what appears to be a provisional invalidation
based on subconstitutional law turns out to be-and, indeed,
might be expected at the moment of decision to be-a final,
unrevisable decision.3 Further, courts might strategically deploy
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law
Center.
1. See DanT. Coenen,A Constitutionof Collaboration:ProtectingFundamentalValues
with Second-Look Rules of InterbranchDialogue, 42 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 1575 (2001). I
understand Professor Coenen's reasons for using the term structuralto describe the rules he
discusses. See id. at 1583-94,1596-1603. I prefer the term subconstitutionalnonetheless, in
part because it avoids the kinds of confusions that Professor Coenen is careful to dispel in
his article.
2. Professor Coenen mentions these problems near the conclusion ofhis comprehensive
article but does not explore them in detail. See id. at 1845-51.
3. I note that some ofthe doctrines Professor Coenen discusses-the doctrines dealing
with no-longer-advanced justifications, desuetude, and changed-facts-mightbe defended on
the ground that they perform the function of cleansing the statute books of laws that
legislatures today would not enact but have not yet repealed. This may be because the
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these subconstitutional doctrines to avoid the sting of the charge
that they are foreclosing legislative choice while effectively doing so.
Second, one might fairly question the need for conclusive judicial
review in the classic mode precisely because these doctrines are so
widely available. Normatively, a combination of full democratic
choice coupled with subconstitutional doctrines to ensure that such
choice is informed, carefully made, and the like, might be more
attractive than a system in which democratic choice is limited
substantively by the courts. Exactly what extra value does
democratic self-governance get from conclusive judicial review?
Pretty clearly, not all that much, in light of the scope of these
subconstitutional doctrines.
These two points are obviously in some tension with each other,
and I do not wish to urge that one or the other is correct. Rather, I
suggest that developing a more complete understanding of
subconstitutional doctrines will require us to grapple with these
and other objections that Professor Coenen mentions largely in
passing. Professor Coenen's survey of subconstitutional law is so
comprehensive that I can hope to use only selected examples to
support these two observations. I believe, though, that my
observations can be extended beyond the particular examples I use.
I. SUBCONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW AS SHAM?
The deep structure, so to speak, of subconstitutional rules is this:
The Court says to a legislature, "You tried to accomplish goal X
through means A. But, you can't do that. We're not saying that you
are precluded in principle from accomplishing goal X. Rather, you
can accomplish goal X, but only by using means B or C." The
problem with this approach is that means A may be the only
politically feasible method of accomplishing goal X. The Court
effectively forecloses the accomplishment of the goal it says is
available in principle, by foreclosing the only politically feasible
method. And, notably, it does so without having to defend the
legislatures have more important things to do or, more interestingly, because the outdated
statutes still have enough supporters to make repeal politically risky. Ithink this a valuable
function, but it pretty clearly does not raise the kinds of questions of democratic selfgovernance that more robust forms ofjudicial review do.
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proposition that the Constitution properly interpreted really does
foreclose the legislature from accomplishing goal X. 4
An example from Canada provides a useful illustration.
Morgentalerv. The Queen, Canada's abortion case, invalidated that
nation's regulation of abortion.5 It did so on what appears in the
first instance to be structural or subconstitutional grounds. The
statute making it a crime to obtain or perform an abortion also
provided a defense. Putting it roughly, doctors would escape
criminal liability if they showed that they had obtained the
permission of a hospital committee finding the abortion medically
appropriate. But, the Canadian Supreme Court said, the facts
showed that this defense was actually illusory because hospital
committees were unable to give their permission in a timely
manner. It would seem, then, that the Canadian Parliament could
continue to criminalize abortion by developing a better system
through which someone would give the doctors the permission
necessary to immunize them from criminal liability.6 Things turned
out otherwise. Afraid to take a position on what was clearly a
divisive political issue, the government allowed a vote on a revision
of the abortion law, but made it a "free"-that is, nonparty
line-vote.7 Parliamentary maneuvering produced a legislative
stalemate, and the law criminaliz ing abortion went unrevised. That
law was, of course, unenforceable after the Morgentalerdecision. A
purportedly procedural ruling had conclusive substantive effect.
The Morgentalermodel can be generalized. A statute results from
the confluence of political forces at the time of enactment. Some
other statute would have been enacted if those forces had been
different. Provisionally invalidating a statute may have conclusive
effect when those political forces remain unchanged, because the
statute actually enacted may have been the only one that could
have emerged from the political process. And, I should emphasize,
this may be true even if all participants in the legislative process
gave as complete consideration of the lurking constitutional
4. Professor Coenen notes this concern. See id. at 1850.
5. [19881 1 S.C.R. 30.
6. Or, presumably, to eliminate the defense entirely.
7. For adescriptionofthepost-Morgenthalerlegislative activity, see F.L. MORTON, PROCHOICE V.PRO-LIFE: ABORTONAND THE COuRTs INCANADA 290-93 (1992).
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questions as the subconstitutional doctrines demand. It is not that
the legislature failed to consider relevant constitutional issues.
Perhaps each legislator fully considered those issues. Then, when
the legislators' diverse views were aggregated in the process of
enacting legislation, the result was a statute that did not-because
it could not-reflect on its face any specific position on the
constitutional issues.'
The foregoing conclusion should be qualified. First, the contours
of the political terrain may have changed. In particular, proponents
of the policy in question may have gained enough power that they
can now do something they could not do earlier: enact a statute that
complies with the Court's subconstitutional demands. Some of
Professor Coenen's time-linked subconstitutional rules make sense
precisely because, as he notes, they provide a chance for a new
political coalition to determine whether, and to what extent, it
wishes to pursue a policy adopted by a prior coalition. The new
coalition might in principle want to eliminate the old coalition's
policy, but the new coalition might have higher priorities. Judicial
invalidation pursuant to a subconstitutional rule gives the new
coalition what it needs without having to affront the old one
directly. In this setting the courts act as political allies of a new
political coalition, accomplishing part of the new coalition's agenda
without taking up the legislature's limited time. One could, of
course, wonder whether courts serving this function are
demonstrating the kind of independence of politics that we usually
associate with rule-of-law ideals.9
Second, the Court's decision may give new information to the
contending parties, and that information may have some impact on
the political balance. Political forces contend over the precise
location of an outcome in what political scientists call a policy
8. I emphasize that my argument combines a perspective drawn from political science
with the normative concerns of traditional constitutional theory, and that, given my training
as a lawyer, I think it would be profitable for political scientists to weigh in on the matters
about which they are more knowledgeable than I.
9. A survey identifying the actual time lags between enactment (or reasoned
reconsideration, as Judge Calabresi suggested in his opinion in Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716,
735, 738-43 (2d Cir. 1996) (Calabresi, J., concurring)) and the judicial invocation of these
time-linked rules would be quite useful as a basis for assessing the contribution these
techniques make to the constitutional order.
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space.' ° Sometimes the outcome results not so much from the
balance of political forces but from contingent facts: agenda control
by one or another actor, the press of time as a legislative session
ends and opportunities for amendment and compromise disappear,
and the like. Many outcomes in the policy space would be politically
acceptable to the contending forces. The Court's new decision may
shift the result from one point within the policy space of potential
outcomes to another.
The doctrines dealing with the "who" of decision making that
Professor Coenen identifies may have this effect. 1 Consider a
President who would like to make policy on some matter, but who
faces resistance from Congress. The President can overcome
resistance by yielding on some other matter of less importance to
him or her. The President's bargaining position is strengthened by
a subconstitutional doctrine saying that the President is the only
decision maker the Constitution permits. Notably, however, these
subconstitutional doctrines do not mean that the President (or other
decision maker identified by the doctrines) necessarily prevails. A
President who moves too far outside what Congress is willing to
accept will be confronted with retaliation in some other area of
presidential concern.' Again, the subconstitutional doctrines shift
the outcome from one point within the policy space defined by the
balance of political forces to another, but rarely will they shift the
outcome to a point outside that policy space.
With these possibilities in mind, we should also consider that
sometimes the Court may want to foreclose the possibility of
legislation without openly defending -thatdesire. The Justices may
calculate that barring the legislature from using the means it has
chosen will have the effect of making further action impossible, as
in the Morgentaler situation. The idea here is that the Justices
10. See CHARLES M. CAMETON, VETO BARGAINING: PRE IDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF

NEGATM POWER 86 (2000).
11. See Coenen, supranote 1, at 1773-1805.

12. The well-documented persistence of effective legislative vetoes even after INS v.
Chadha,462 U.S. 919 (1983), is an example of the role that political forces continue to play
even after the Court identifies a constitutionally mandated decision maker. Fora discussion
of the persistence of legislative vetoes or their functional equivalent after Chadha, see
JESSIcA KOEN, THE POWER OF SEPARATION: AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE MYTH

OF THE LEGISLATV VETO (1996).
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engage in a certain kind of political prediction on two levels: one
about the public acceptability of a substantive decision, and one
about the possibility of legislative enactment of the same
substantive policy, but in a different form. A strategic Court would
invoke subconstitutional doctrines after calculating that the risk of
public rejection of a substantive decision is too high and that the
legislature will be unable to reenact the statute in the form that the
subconstitutional doctrine suggests would be constitutional.
As Professor Coenen notes, such calculations, if they occur, may
be mistaken. The Court developed clear-statement rules to protect
states from monetary liability under federal statutes."3 It turned
out that the beneficiaries of Congress's first efforts had enough
power to get Congress to reenact the statutes with sufficiently clear
statements. The Court then imposed the substantive limits
14
anyway.
The state immunity cases suggest a broader concern. Sometimes
invoking subconstitutional rules is a sham, when the Court
correctly calculates that those rules eliminate the only political
feasible method of reaching the legislature's desired goal. And it is
unclear what the subconstitutional rules contribute if, in the end,
the Court must confront the underlying substantive question
anyway. 15

II. SUBCONSTiTUTIONAL REVIEW AS SuBsTITuTE?
Professor Coenen's catalogue of subconstitutional doctrines is so
comprehensive that I am left wondering, what role is left for
substantive constitutional review? Suppose that courts sincerely
deploy these subconstitutional doctrines, structuring decision
making by the political branches in a way that ensures reasonably
13. See Coenen, supranote 1, at 1624-26 (discussingAtascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234 (1985)).
14. See id. at 1626. Notably, the substantive decisions have been far more controversial,
at least among commentators, than the clear-statement decisions. That is, the Court's firstlevel political calculation, about public acceptability, appears to have been correct even
though its second-level one was not.
15. I note, for example, that Professor Coenen wonders whether the subconstitutional

rules developed in the current Court's early state immunity cases should survive now that
the Court has imposed a substantive limitation on Congress's power. See id. at 1627-29.
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full consideration of constitutionally sensitive issues. Why should
the courts play any other role?
I am less skeptical than many others of the political branches'
ability to deal reasonably with constitutional issues. 6 The Court's
subconstitutional doctrines, if anything, are likely to improve the
political branches' performance. We should consider the possibility
that these doctrines improve the political branches' performance so
much that the need for substantive review will disappear. One need
not be a Pollyanna about this possibility. The political branches will
never be perfect constitutional decision makers, under any
particular criterion of goodness. But, then, neither will the Court,
unless the criterion of constitutional goodness is the purely
positivist one that says, "The Constitution is what the Supreme
Court says it is." Both the Court and the political branches, that is,
will make constitutional errors according to any specified criterion.
It could be that the subconstitutional doctrines, properly deployed,"7
reduce the number and significance of the political branches' errors
to the point where they are less important than the errors the
courts commit.
Professor Coenen notes this argument, albeit in a somewhat
sidewise manner. He defends the invocation of subconstitutional
doctrines on the ground that they "reflect a wise and deeply rooted
commitment to judicial restraint" while "leav[ing] courts with
significant powers," particularly traditional substantive review.'8
Professor Coenen's defense of subconstitutional doctrines suggests
the form he would give in a direct response to the question of the
need for substantive judicial review. As I read his final section,
Professor Coenen finds the normative justification for doctrine,
whether it be subconstitutional doctrine or substantive judicial
review, in long-standing practice supported by "text, tradition,
history, and precedent." 9

16. See Mark Tushnet, CongressionalConstitutionalInterpretation:Some Criteriaand
Two Informal Case Studies, DuKE L. J. (forthcoming 2001).
17. That is, taking into account the possibility that the Court will make a mistake in
invoking one ofthe subconstitutional doctrines, just as it can make mistakes in substantive
review.
18. Coenen, supranote 1, at 1834-35.
19. Id. at 1851.
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Notably absent from this is an obvious additional candidate:
normative democratic theory. The reason for that absence is clear
enough to me. Reconciling substantive constitutional review with
normative democratic theory has proved enormously difficult. As far
as I can tell, all efforts at reconciliation founder on a single
problem. There are uncontroversial constitutional norms such as
"protect free speech" and "treat everyone with equal dignity and
respect." Difficulty arises when we try to figure out what those
abstract and uncontroversial norms mean in any particular setting,
that is, when we try to determine whether a specific statute
contravenes the norms. Reasonable people can reasonably disagree
on particular applications even while they agree on the abstract
norms. Typically, substantive judicial review is defended on the
ground that courts have institutional characteristics that make
them more likely than the political branches to select a specification
of the abstract norm that lies within the range of reasonableness.
That defense seems to me quite hard to make out once we have, as
I believe we should have, an appropriately expansive sense of what
the range of reasonable specifications of the abstract norms is. 0
Skeptics might respond by identifying a Supreme Court decision,
decided on substantive grounds, that is unequivocally right
according to some criterion. Candidates might be Brown v. Board
of Education2 ' or Texas v. Johnson.22 The general form of my reply
to the skeptic would be to identify potential subconstitutional
doctrines that Inight have been invoked to avoid the substantive
decision while offering the political branches the opportunity to
reconsider their commitment to the questioned statutes. The
skeptic might reply that the candidate cases are good ones to test
my claim because they are cases where the nearly certain response
from the political branches would have been the readoption of the
statutes. I think that this reply is a good one for Texas v. Johnson.'
20. Formyelaborationofthis argument, see MARKTUsHNET, TAKINGTHE CONSTITUTION

AWAY FROM THE CouRTs (1999). See also FRANKL MICHEUmAN, BRENNAN AND DEMOCRACY,
ch. 1 (1999).
21. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding school segregation unconstitutional).
22. 491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989) (finding unconstitutional a statute that prohibited flag
desecration).
23. I emphasize again that identifying one or more legislative errors corrected by the

courts through substantive judicial review is insufficient to establishthe overall value ofsuch
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I wonder, though, whether there might not be subconstitutional
doctrines that would have allowed the Court inBrown to insist that
imposing a policy of segregation had to be done on the national level
(a "who decides" kind of subconstitutional doctrine, in Professor
Coenen's terms), pursuant to a clearer statement than existed in
any statute on the books in 1954. That would have forced the
proponents of segregation to take the initiative in Congress, and my
guess is that they would have been unable to obtain enough support
there to enact segregation policies even though they had enough
power to block the enactment of antisegregation ones.
Subconstitutional doctrines, however, need not be inconsistent
with normative democratic theory if they do not foreclose any
substantive legislative choice. They clearly do not do so in theory,
for their entire point is to ensure full consideration of constitutional
norms by the political branches without dictating the content of
those branches' conclusions.' Professor Coenen might have
strengthened the case for subconstitutional doctrines by invoking
normative democratic theory.' In doing so, though, he would have
been less able to defend subconstitutional review on the ground
that, after all is said and done, it preserves the possibility of
substantive judicial review. But, it is unclear to me why one should
regard that loss as a matter of regret.
CONCLUSION
As Professor Coenen shows, scholars have noticed the existence of subconstitutional doctrines before, and some have even
tried to generalize them into a theory of structural due process.
Professor Coenen's signal contribution is to demonstrate that
subconstitutional doctrines are more common than even prior
review. Afull assessmentmust also consider errors the courts themselves make in exercising
substantive judicial review, and determine whether the judicial errors are less important
overall than the errors made by the political branches. And, of course, all this depends on
there being some agreement among the discussants on what the criterion for identifying
errors is.
24. As discussed earlier, subconstitutional doctrines may foreclose substantive choices
in practice. See supra notes 4-15 and accompanying text.
25. See TUSMEr, supranote 20, at 163-65, for a brief discussion of this point. Were I to
write that passage again, I would certainly cite Professor Coenen's work.
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scholars have thought, and indeed that such doctrines pervade the
Supreme Court's work. In doing so, Professor Coenen makes it
possible to ask what these doctrines actually do, and whether they
are so pervasive that we could get along quite well with
subconstitutional doctrine and no substantive judicial review.
Professor Coenen's important article does what good scholarship
should: open up paths for further exploration. Perhaps this
Comment shows that some of those paths might lead to quite
unexpected destinations. So much the better for his article.

